

## Message Text

SECRET

PAGE 01 SEOUL 08033 030843Z

11

ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 /026 W

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R 030759Z DEC 74

FM AMEMBASSY SEOUL

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 7259

INFO CINCPAC

S E C R E T SEOUL 8033

EXDIS

CINCPAC FOR POLAD

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: MASS, MILI, KS, FR

SUBJECT: EXOCET; M-16S

REF: STATE 236486 AND PREVIOUS

SUMMARY: AT MEETING WITH PRIMIN KIM CHONG PIL DEC. 3, I INFORMED HIM OF OUR REFUSAL TO CONSENT TO ROK PURCHASE OF EXOCET OR SALE OF M-16S TO MOROCCO. M-16 DECISION ACCEPTED BY PRIMIN WITHOUT ARGUMENT. HOWEVER, EXOCET DECISION WAS QUESTIONED ON TECHNICAL GROUNDS, AND MATTER WILL BE PURSUED FURTHER WITH MINISTRY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE (MND). END SUMMARY

1. M-16S - AFTER I OUTLINED OUR OBJECTIONS TO SALE OF M-16S TO MOROCCO, PRIMIN REVIEWED HISTORY OF MOROCCAN REQUEST. HE SAID MOROCCAN FONMIN DURING VISIT TO KOREA HAD REQUESTED RIFLES ON GROUNDS IT WOULD TAKE TOO LONG TO GET THEM FROM U.S. SOURCES. PRIMIN TOLD MOROCCAN FONMIN THAT CO-PRODUCTION OF M-16S WAS ARRANGED AS PART OF MODERNIZATION PLAN AND PRODUCTION NEEDED FOR ROK FORCES. FURTHERMORE, ROK WAS NOT IN POSITION TO PROVIDE MOROCCO WITH M-16S WITHOUT U.S. CONSENT. HE HAD SUGGESTED TO MOROCCAN FORMIN THAT HE SPEAK DIRECTLY TO U.S. OFFICIALS, BUT PRIMIN AGREED TO GET IN TOUCH WITH U.S. DIRECTLY AS WELL. ROK HAS NOT SUBSEQUENTLY HEARD FROM MOROCCAN GOVT ON THIS MATTER; IF IT DOES, IT WILL INFORM MOROCCAN GOVT OF ITS INABILITY TO

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PROVIDE M-16S.

2. EXOCET - I REVIEWED CAREFULLY FOR PRIMIN BOTH OUR TECHNICAL REASONS AND POLITICAL ARGUMENTS FOR OBTAINING STANDARD ARMS RATHER THAN EXOCET. I ALSO INFORMED HIM THAT WE WOULD BE PREPARED TO PROVIDE HARPOON MISSILES.

3. PRIMIN AT OUTSET STATED THAT ROK POLICY WAS TO DEVELOP ITS WEAPONS SYSTEM IN COOPERATION WITH THE U.S. PRESIDENT PARK HAD DIRECTED THAT THIRD COUNTRY ACQUISITIONS WOULD BE UNDERTAKEN ONLY WITH U.S. AGREEMENT. HARPOON IS ROK CHOICE FOR EQUIPPING PSSMS, BUT SINCE WILL NOT BE AVAILABLE BEFORE 1977, ROK IS SEEKING INTERIM SYSTEM FOR THE FIRST TWO OF THE TEN PSSMS TO BE BUILT.

4. PRIMIN EXPLAINED THAT ROK MILITARY OBJECTION TO STANDARD ARM IS TARGET ACQUISITION SYSTEM WHICH HOMES IN ON ENEMY RADAR. IF ENEMY RADAR IS TURNED OFF, STANDARD ARM CANNOT BE USED, ACCORDING TO ROK MILITARY. THEREFORE, PRESIDENT PARK DIRECTED THAT ROK OFFICIALS EXPLORE WITH FRENCH ACQUISITION OF EXOCET FOR FIRST TWO OF TEN PSSMS (REMAINDER WOULD USE HARPOON), AND PROVIDING THAT U.S. WOULD CONSENT. FIRST TWO WILL BE PRODUCED BEFORE HARPOON AVAILABLE.

5. FRENCH GOVT HAS NOW FORMALLY NOTIFIED ROKG THAT IT WILL BE ABLE TO PROVIDE EXOCETS FOR TWO PSSMS AND PRESIDENT HAS DIRECTED FURTHER NEGOTIATIONS WITH FRENCH, PROVIDED U.S. IS IN AGREEMENT, IN FACT, FOREIGN MINISTRY MISSION IS PLANNING TO GO TO PARIS NEXT WEEK.

6. I REITERATED THAT WE WERE NOT PREPARED TO CONSENT TO PURCHASE OF EXOCET, ALTHOUGH PRIMIN ARGUED THAT REMAINING EIGHT OF PSSMS WOULD BE EQUIPPED WITH U.S. WEAPONS. I SUGGESTED THAT TECHNICAL PROBLEMS RAISED BY PRIMIN BE DISCUSSED BETWEEN U.S. MILITARY EXPERTS AND MND IN EFFORT TO CLEAR UP PROBLEM RAISED BY PRIMIN. HE AGREED AND ASKED THAT THIS WOULD BE DONE EXPEDITIOUSLY. I HAVE DIRECTED MAAG CHIEF TO GET IN TOUCH WITH MND IMMEDIATELY.

7. COMMENT: ALTHOUGH PRIMIN WAS MORE ADAMANT THAN ANTICIPATED ON PURSUING EXOCET PROPOSAL, MY EXPECTATION IS THAT WE CAN SETTLE THIS PROBLEM ON TECHNICAL MILITARY BASIS.

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8. PRIMIN ALSO INQUIRED ABOUT STATUS F4DS AND I TOLD HIM WE EXPECTED EARLY WORD.  
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## Message Attributes

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